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Insider Power Breeds Human Capitalists
Joan Muysken and Thomas Zwick

Abstract
The focus of this paper is on rent distribution under dierent labour
market regimes. When workers determine human capital investment and
wages freely, while the rm sets labour demand, the rent created is shared.
Investment in human capital is then ineciently low. When there are
unemployed potential entrants threatening to enter and catch some of the
rent, however, the insiders have to concede a higher share of the rent to
the rm. They might however erect barriers to entry by sinking costs for
investment in human capital. It is shown under which circumstances rents
are shared between insiders and outsiders by allowing the latter ones to
enter the labour market. Finally, it is shown which consequences on rent
creation and labour demand the behaviour of the insiders has.
1 Introduction
This paper shows the consequences of potential entry into the labour market on
rent creation and appropriation of the workers. The main question is, if insiders
gain market power, when there are no transaction costs for labour turnover, but
sunk costs are required for human capital investment. The outsiders and insiders
are assumed to be identical. The only dierences are that the insiders have a
rst-mover advantage that gives them the possibility to inuence the behaviour
of the outsiders by committing themselves. In addition to that it is assumed that
insiders are oered the jobs before the outsiders, if the prot oer is the same.
In order to compare the positions of the various parties on the labour market,
we choose as a benchmark a perfectly functioning labour market where the entire
labour supply is employed and investment is ecient, if the insiders have no
market power. The benchmark is used to analyze the consequences of market
power of the insiders on rent distribution and rent creation.
The extreme form of insider power can be found in a model where the incum-
bent workers face no job competition from potential entrants. This scenario is

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called the monopolistic worker scenario. When there are active outsiders present,
they will oer the maximum prot to the rm in order to maximize their chance
to enter the labour market. The insiders have to equal that prot oer, if they do
not want to be replaced by their rivals. It will be shown that the insiders are able
to hinder the entry of the outsiders by sinking costs in human capital formation.
In an alternative scenario, the cooperation scenario, the assumption of the
outsiders' behaviour is changed from maximizing the prot of the rm to cooper-
ation with the insiders. Then both groups of workers are employed and the part
of the rent attributed to the workers is shared between insiders and entrants.
2 The structure of the model
In order to tackle the question, if rent appropriation of insiders may arise due to
human capital investment, the contestability theory (see e.g. Baumol (1982) or
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988)) is applied to the labour market. The results
of the labour market are therefore not determined by conjectural variations of
the incumbents or bargaining between employers and employees, but by pressures
of (potential) entry. As in contestability theory, potential competition serves as
a disciplinary device for the wage setting and investment in human capital of
the incumbents. One important feature of contestable market theory, hit-and-
run entry, is, however, excluded in the labour market context. On the other
hand, the application to the labour market has the advantage that there are|
in contrast to industrial organization| \natural" potential entrants if there is
unemployment. In addition, rigid wages are not as problematic an assumption,
if we assume wage bargaining where wages are xed for a certain period. In this
case it can be assumed that labour demand is more exible than wages.
The most obvious application of the idea that potential entry may have an in-
uence on the decisions of incumbents on the labour market is the insider-outsider
approach a la Lindbeck and Snower (1988). Here all outsiders are unemployed
potential entrants and compete with the incumbents in wage setting and supply
of human capital. Rent appropriation is explained in these models by reasons
as sinking costs for harassment, labour turnover costs and the eects of labour
turnover on eort.
The crucial new assumption in our model is that there are no transaction
costs (as assumed in perfectly contestable markets), i.e. that entry and exit is
costless. This is assumed in order to see if the introduction of sunk costs for labour
market investments leads to a market power (i.e. the possibility to appropriate
rents) of the insiders that is comparable with transaction costs. In order to give
the outsiders as much \aggressiveness" and the same position as the insiders
(as assumed in perfect contestable markets), outsiders oer the rm the highest
possible prot in order to maximize their chance to enter the labour market.
Moreover, we assume that the human capital endowment and the possibilities to
2
create new special human capital are identical for insiders and outsiders. The later
assumptions can be motivated by the notion that the outsiders may be recently
dismissed and have therefore still no comparative disadvantage with respect to the
insiders in the industry they until recently worked in. In addition, they know that
their human capital would depreciate over time and therefore they are aggressive
in order to reenter as soon as possible. Investments in human capital always entail
elements of sunk costs as they cannot be fully used in other employment relations.
In order to sharpen the argument, we assume that only special human capital is
needed in the labour market in question, while productivity in other rms is not
aected by additional specic human capital.
1
This, however, introduces sunk
costs in the model that can lead to market power of the insiders or induce barriers
to entry.
2
Our insider-outsider scenario preserves most of the salient structural assump-
tions taken by Lindbeck and Snower (1988):
1. Each employee's bonus is negotiated for one period at a time. (The notion
of an initiation period for entrants before they are insiders is skipped here.) This
bonus is related to the investment in human capital and is in addition to some
xed basic wage.
2. Outsiders are perfect competitors for jobs, i.e. insiders and outsiders are
assumed to be equally productive before investment into human capital takes
place. Therefore the entrant's bonus is equal to the lowest possible level.
3. Each insider sets his/her bonus individually, taking the strategies of all
other agents as given.
4. The insider's bonus is contingent on his investment in human capital.
This is in contrast to the incontingency of insider's wages on cooperation and
harassment activities in Lindbeck and Snower's model.
5. Employment decisions are made unilaterally by the rm.
6. In the last stage, the rm makes the employment decisions, taking the
bonus demand and human capital levels as being given. These parameters are
set by the insiders rst and the outsiders react to them.
Due to this symmetrical set-up without turnover costs, the insiders are not
able to acquire rents, if there would be no opportunity to invest in specic human
capital.
2.1 The rm
The rm maximizes its prots . We assume that the production function of the
rm is of Cobb-Douglas type.
3
The revenues of the rm depend on the number of
1
See Becker (1983) pp. 26 . for the classication in general and special human capital.
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Compare e.g. Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988) pp. 290 ., Shepherd (1984) and Stiglitz
(1987).
3
The production function with homogeneous labour input and human capital input is similar
to the formulation in Lindbeck and Snower (1991), p. 194. The eort part is substituted by
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workers l and the homogeneous level of new human capital per worker c gained by
the workers. In the next period, the new investment into human capital would be
added and therefore productivity increases over time. In order to keep the model
as simple as possible, we do not take that into account, however. The rm pays a
\basic" wage w and a bonus b dependent on the level of new human capital. This
is a partial equilibrium model, where the market wage w and labour productivity
A are assumed to be exogeneously given. Therefore the prot function of the
rm reads as:
 = Al

c

  (bc + w)l (1)
with 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1:
Here the price of the good produced is normalized to unity. It can be shown
that the revenue function is valid under dierent elasticities of demand or market
structures.
4
The parameter c denotes specic new human capital per worker
and it is assumed that without this specic human capital that is gained in the
preceding stage, production is not possible. The rm sets its labour demand and
takes the level of specic new human capital and the bonus that has to be paid
for it as given. Notice that the rm just accepts workers with the same amount
of human capital. Outsiders are therefore hired in addition to insiders, only if
they oer the same human capital. There is also, however, the possibility that
all insiders are replaced by outsiders, if the human capital diers and outsiders
oer a higher prot to the rm.
From the prot function of the rm (1), the demand for labour can be derived
by taking the rst order condition with respect to l:
l =
 
Ac

bc + w
!
1
1 
(2)
Firm's labour demand is therefore negatively dependent on the costs for labour b
and w, while the impact of investment in human capital c depends on the size of
c: for small c it is increasing, for larger c it decreases. This is due to the concavity
of the revenue function and the linearity of the cost function with respect to c:
2.2 The workers
There is a potential labour force of L workers, made up from l
 1
insiders and
n outsiders in the initial period. The homogeneous insiders optimize individu-
ally their surplus that is dened as the monetary income.
5
They can determine
new human capital. In this, it is implicitly assumed that higher specic job skills lead to higher
productivity (as higher eort leads to higher productivity).
4
See appendix.
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The same conclusions could also be achieved by introducing a union of insiders, compare
Lindbeck and Snower (1990), p. 195.
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the investment in specic human capital (and therefore the resulting level of c)
and the bonus b they obtain. There is however a trade-o between the human
capital/bonus combination and the certainty to be able to keep the job. The
labour demand of the rm is falling when there is a higher bonus demand if the
human capital is kept equal. If labour demand is smaller than the number of
insiders in the previous period l
 1
, then every worker faces the same probability
to lose his/her job. Insiders are therefore not interested in total labour demand,
but in labour demand relative to supply in the previous period. Moreover each
insider assumes then that she/he is the marginal worker in the rm's employment
decision.
6
In dening the surplus function of the insiders, two situations can be dis-
tinguished. In both cases it is assumed that the insiders can outperform the
outsiders. The rst possibility is found when l  l
 1
: The surplus function for
insiders reads as:
s = (bc + w)  (1 + r)c
2
(3)
That is, the insiders earn the wage in the primary labour market w plus the
bonus b on special human capital with certainty, while they have to subtract
the investment in specic capital. The costs of investment are assumed to be
quadratic in the amount of human capital, c; therefore the investment in specic
human capital shows decreasing returns to scale. As the investment is done in
the previous period, the interest costs for investment in specic human capital
have to be taken into account, where r is the exogeneous rate of interest (or the
individual discount rate).
The second possibility is that l < l
 1
. Then we nd:
7
s =
l
l
 1
(bc+ w) +
 
1 
l
l
 1
!
s  (1 + r)c
2
(4)
The wage and bonus mark-up over the outside option is earned with probabil-
ity
l
l
 1
: The exogeneous outside option s is earned in the case of unemployment,
while the investment costs have to be made with certainty.
The same arguments apply for the outsiders, who have to divide the labour
demand of the rm by the number of outsiders in the initial period n. If labour
demand is larger than the number of insiders in the previous period, the rm will
6
See also Lindbeck and Snower (1988), p. 172. By assuming that the workers are equal
and taking the consequences of their decisions into account, we circumvent the problem that
individually rational decisions may produce inferior solutions in prisoners-dilemma structures
(compare e.g. Vogt (1986)). The main argument in favour of this assumption is the right of the
workers to set the bonus themselves and therefore being able to directly inuence the labour
demand of the rm.
7
This is the formulation for the objective functions of workers (unions) most widely spread,
compare e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), p. 100 and Carrut and Oswald (1987), p.
433.
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hire outsiders if they oer the same level of special human capital as the insiders,
because the production function does not allow for employment of workers with
dierent levels of human capital. If l < n, the analogous surplus function of the
outsiders reads as:
s =
l
n
(bc+ w) +
 
1 
l
n
!
s  (1 + r)c
2
(5)
Otherwise equation (3) also denes the surplus of the outsider.
3 Dierent scenarios
3.1 The benchmark scenario
A typical benchmark case would be to introduce a social planner who maximizes
the total rent from investment in human capital. The total rent is dened by:
R =  +Ls; that is total rent equals the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
In the full employment case l  L; this can be rewritten:
R = AL

c

  (1 + r)Lc
2
(6)
In the unemployment case l < L; the sum of consumer and producer surplus
equals:
e
R = Al

c

+ (L  l)s  (1 + r)Lc
2
+
e
w(L  l)
with
e
w  0; (L   l)  0 and
e
w(L   l) = 0: Here,
e
w is the shadow price of
unemployment. If
e
R is maximized with respect to c and l simultaneously, we nd
for labour demand:
8
e
l =
 
A
s
!
2 
2 2 
 
A
2(1 + r)L
!

2 2 
(7)
It seems reasonable to assume that the social planner will set the level of
the exogeneous outside option such that labour demand is not lower than labour
supply. Setting
e
l equal to L, we nd from (7) that for the outside option should
hold:
s <
b
s =

L
 


A
2
L
2 
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(8)
For analytical clarity, we introduce the parameter  to indicate the ratio between
s and the maximum outside option
b
s :
s = 
b
s;   1
8
Notice that in this scenario, the rm is not on its labour demand function (2).
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Ecient investment in human capital is therefore found when total rent with full
employment (6) is maximized with respect to c:
c
r
=
 
A
2(1 + r)L
1 
!
1
2 
(9)
It is interesting to note that these results are consistent with a situation in
which the workers choose the optimal prot for the rm in order to maximize their
probability to enter the labour market. The optimal prot that can be oered
by the potential entrants is calculated by attributing the right to determine all
parameters to the rm. The workers are not willing to invest in a job that gives
them an expected surplus lower than their outside option, however. Hence the
prot function of the rm (1) is maximized under the constraint that the surplus
(3) equals the outside option.
It will be assumed that also the social planner attributes the entire rent in
excess to s to the rm. We do this in order to be able to assess the impact
of market power of the workers on the functioning of the labour market in the
following scenarios.
Substituting c
r
, L and the minimal bonus (i.e. b such that the surplus with
labour certainty (3) is equal to s) into the prot function of the rm then gives
the benchmark prot level if the entire excess rent is attributed to the rm:

r
=

1 

2
  

 


L
2 
A
2
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(10)
The prot of the rm increases with the competition between the workers (L
increases) when 2 > ; and decreases otherwise. Since the latter result seems
counterintuitive, we assume  >
1
2
.
9
Moreover we assume  +
1
2
 < 1, since the
prot of the rm should always be positive.
10
The prot of the rm decreases
when s and (1 + r) increase, while it increases with A.
3.2 Monopolistic insider workers scenario
In this scenario it is assumed that the n outsiders are passive and do not try to
enter the market. The l
 1
monopolistic insider workers have therefore maximal
market power. They maximize their surplus by setting bonus demand and the
level of special human capital, taking into consideration that the rm determines
the amount of labour demanded.
Since the surplus with job uncertainty (4) is always smaller than the surplus
with certainty (3), the optimal new human capital - bonus - ratio will be chosen
9
The counter-intuitive result can be explained by a low increase of productivity that is
connected with an increase in the labour force if  is small, while costs increase linearly with
L.
10
This is a sucient condition which holds exacly, when bs = s:
7
such that l = l
 1
.
11
If the surplus of the insiders (3) is maximized with respect to
c; and b is set optimally, i.e. such that the labour demand of the rm (2) equals
l
 1
, we obtain:
c
mon
=
 
A
2(1 + r)l
1 
 1
!
1
2 
(11)
The investment of the monopolistic workers increases with its eciency A and
decreases with the costs (1 + r). When comparing the investment of the mo-
nopolistic workers to that in the reference scenario, we nd investment to be
ineciently high, i.e. c
mon
> c
r
, when the number of insiders in the last period
is smaller than a share 
1
1 
of the entire labour force.
12
This is due to the fact
that the investment of workers increases when the number of competitors (l
 1
)
decreases, because a lower rent-share has to be transferred to the rm in order
to obtain a lower labour demand.
With respect to bonus demand, we nd:
b
mon
=
A
l
1 
 1
(c
mon
)
1 
 
w
c
mon
(12)
In order to make sure that they will be employed, the insiders set a lower bonus
demand, if the exogeneous basis wage w is higher. The surplus the monopolistic
workers enjoy is calculated by substituting (11) and (12) into (3):
s
mon
=
 
A
2

2


l
2 
 1
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(1  )
l
 1
(13)
In line with our reasoning, it should clearly hold that s
mon
> s. Since
b
s is the
largest admissible value of s, see (8), we require that the number of outsiders is
so large that s
mon
>
b
s holds.
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Substituting (11) and (12) into the prot function of the rm (1), we get:

mon
=
 




A
2
l
2 
 1
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(1  ) (14)
Notice that the signs of the comparative statics with respect to the parameters A
and (1+r) are the same as in the reference scenario (compare (10))|this is due to
rent sharing. We also nd, as in the case of the reference scenario, that in contrast
11
This statement is proven in the appendix.
12
This corresponds to ]0, 0.368[ for  = ]0,1[.
13
This implies
l
 1
L
<
h
(1  )
2 


i
1
2(1 )
The right-hand side simplies to 
1
1 
if  = 1  . Note that this implies c
mon
> c
r
.
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to the surplus of the monopolistic workers, the prot of the rm increases with
the competition between the workers (l
 1
increases) since we assume 2 > .
Whether the prot the workers in the reference scenario oer is smaller or
larger than that oered by the monopolistic workers depends on the size of two
countervailing eects. On the one hand, the prot of the rm in the reference
scenario is higher, because there is no inecient bias in investment due to rent
sharing - the entire rent in addition to the outside option is attributed to the rm
in the benchmark case. On the other hand, the motivation to invest is for the
monopolistic insiders higher, because there are fewer rivals. Taking into account,
however, that  has to be so small that the surplus of the workers s
mon
is larger
than the outside option s; it can be shown that this implies that the prot in
the reference scenario is larger than in the monopolistic worker scenario. This is
intuitive, because the rent generated is maximized in the reference scenario. If
in the cooperative scenario with an inecient investment the prot of the rm
would be larger than 
r
, this can only be the case, if s
mon
< s: Therefore, 
mon
is always smaller than 
r
.
3.3 The insider-outsider scenario
In the insider-outsider scenario, we show under which circumstances the insiders
are able to erect barriers to entry by investing in human capital. The conse-
quences of barriers to entry for the rent-distribution and rent creation are also
highlighted. Here, the incumbents maximize their surplus under the constraint
that the outsiders can't outperform them (limit pricing). The time structure of
the game is:
stage action
1 insiders invest in human capital and set their bonus demand
2 outsiders invest in human capital and set their bonus demand, or both not
3 the rm decides how many people and which ones to employ
The insiders invest in human capital in order to signal that in the next pe-
riod they will be able to match the potential prot oer of the outsiders. The
question then is, whether the insiders can credibly threaten that they are able to
outperform the outsiders. If so, the outsiders will not invest. To investigate this,
we will rst dene the threat of the outsiders. Then the behaviour of the insiders
will be analyzed.
3.3.1 The problem of the outsiders
We found in section 3.1 that the benchmark scenario is consistent with a situation
in which the workers choose the optimal prot for the rm in order to maximize
their probability to enter the labour market. Therefore the case of the outsiders
is essentially the reference scenario where the number of workers is not the pool
9
of workers, L, but the number of outsiders n.
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From equation (10), we derive
the prot oer of the outsiders, 
o
:

o
=
0
@
1 

2
  

n
L

2 2
2 
1
A
 


n
2 
A
2
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(15)
The term after  in this equation is introduced to compensate for the dierence
between the highest possible outside option in the benchmark scenario,
b
s, and its
analogue for the outsiders. Notice that 
o
< 
r
; compare (15) with (14).
As the prot of the rm increases with the number of outsiders, the threat
of the outsiders to replace the insiders increases also with their number. If the
insiders had no market power, they would have to copy the behaviour of the
outsiders in order to be able to keep their jobs. Then the bench-mark scenario
would hold, the entire labour force L be employed, the rent maximized and
completely given to the rm.
3.3.2 The problem of the insiders
The insiders maximize their surplus under the constraint that the demand for
labour is larger or equal than l
 1
15
and that   
o
, i.e. that the insiders
will be preferred to the outsiders. With their investment in the rst period the
incumbents have to show that they are able and willing to match the prot oer
of the outsiders.
It is a-priori unclear if the prot oered by the monopolistic insiders is higher
or lower than the prot oered by the outsiders.
16
If 
mon
> 
o
; the insiders are
able to keep the outsiders from their jobs without changing their monopolistic
behaviour, i.e. the insiders' surplus is s
mon
. This case is more probable, when
l
 1
n
is large, or if there are only relatively few outsiders. As it is usually assumed
in insider-outsider models that the number of outsiders is large, we want to rule
out the case where 
mon
> 
o
.
If 
mon
< 
o
, however, the insiders have to set b and c such that  = 
o
and l = l
 1
are valid simultaneously, if they want to keep the potential entrants
outside. It can be shown that this strategy may give a surplus for the insiders
that is higher than s. This is formally done by solving labour demand of the
rm (2) which is set equal to the number of outsiders, l
-1
; for b. This function is
14
It can easily be shown that when the optimal amount of human capital is invested, prots
are increasing in the number of outsiders.
15
Here, once again the argument applies that (4) is always larger than (3), see appendix.
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The condition for 
mon
> 
o
is:
 

1 +
l
 1
n

2+

l
 1
n

2 2
!
1
2 
>
2   
2"
2
2 
10
then substituted in the prot function (1) which is set equal to the prot level
the outsiders oer, 
o
; evaluated at l
 1
and solved for c:
c
i
=
 

o
(1  )Al

 1
!
1

(16)
It is unclear whether the investment of the insiders is larger or smaller than
ecient investment c
r
; see equation (9). The investment of the insiders is inef-
ciently high, if there are many outsiders and if the outside option is low. The
reason is that with lower outside option the bench-mark prot the insiders have
to oer is larger and the investment of the insiders increases with the benchmark
prot. If the number of rivals increases, the incentive to invest decreases, due to
the sunk costs eect. Consequently, investment of the insiders is ineciently low
if the outside option is high and if there are not too many outsiders.
The values obtained for b and c, when substituted into the surplus function
of the incumbent (3) give nally:
s
i
=

o
(1  )l
 1
  (1 + r)
 

o
(1  )Al

 1
!
2

(17)
The surplus of the insiders increases when
l
 1
n
is low. This is due to the fact
that a small number of insiders have to oer the same prot as a larger number
of outsiders. If the number of insiders increases, however, the surplus decreases,
which is due to the right of the rm to set employment. This requires a lower
bonus demand when the number of insiders increases. It is obvious that the
surplus the insiders earn may be larger than the outside option s. However it is
always the case that the surplus of the insiders with outsiders present is smaller
than s
mon
, if not 
mon
> 
o
which we ruled out above. Thus the mere presence
of outsiders decreases the market power of the incumbents and forces them to
grant a larger part of the rent to the rm and adapt their investment behaviour
in order to be able to stay employed. Therefore it is possible that the surplus of
the insiders is smaller than their outside option, if they want to prevent outsiders
from entry. In this case, barrier to entry is no viable option for the insiders.
It may therefore be optimal for the insiders to cooperate with the outsiders
and allow for entry. We discuss this below.
3.3.3 The cooperative scenario
In this scenario, we show that it may be optimal for the insiders to oer coop-
eration to the outsiders, maximizing the joint surplus of both groups of workers
and oering therefore part of the rent to the entrants. It is always a dominant
strategy for the outsiders to cooperate, if the insiders cooperate, because this
grants them|in contrast to the outsider scenario|part of the rent.
11
The result is then an investment of the insiders that is calculated by the same
method as in the monopolistic worker scenario, but taking into account that the
outsiders will be employed also. The outsiders imitate it in the second stage. The
investment that maximizes the surplus of the entire work-force is then:
c
c
=
 
A
2(1 + r)L
1 
!
1
2 
(18)
This is a smaller investment than in the monopolistic insider workers scenario
(compare (11)), because the workers calculate with a demand for labour of L
instead of l
 1
and behave like monopolists. The investment is also smaller than
ecient investment c
r
. This is due to the fact that the workers cannot claim
all the rent from investment. If the workers kept the entire rent created, labour
demand would be zero. Therefore the right to set labour demand guarantees the
rm a share of the rent, also in the case where the workers cooperate.
The bonus demand, the surplus of the insiders and outsiders and the surplus of
the workers are calculated analogously to the monopolistic insider worker scenario
in section 3.2:
s
c
=
 
A
2

2


2

L
2 2
(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(1  ) (19)
The surplus of the workers is smaller than that the monopolistic workers enjoy
(compare (13)). It is however ambiguous, whether s
c
is smaller or larger than s
i
:
The probability that s
i
> s
c
is large, when the number of unemployed outsiders
is large. The surplus the workers enjoy in the cooperative scenario may be even
lower than the outside option, because s
c
= (1   )
2
2 
b
s, hence s
c
<
b
s: This
is due to the fact, that in the benchmark scenario ecient bargaining between
workers and the rm takes place. In this scenario the rm is not at its labour
demand curve (2) and the entire rent is attributed to it. Therefore the highest
outside option that is admissible with full employment,
b
s, is higher than in the
cooperative scenario. In the cooperative scenario, which is a right-to-manage
case, the rm is always on its labour demand curve and the surplus enjoyed by
the workers decreases with the number of rivals for the jobs. In addition to
that investment is not ecient due to rent sharing which reduces the rent to be
distributed.
The associated prot level of the rm is in this scenario:

c
=
 




A
2
L
2 
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 
(1  ) (20)
It is unclear, whether the prot the rm earns in the cooperative scenario is higher
or lower than that in the reference scenario. Taking into account however|like
in the monopolistic workers scenario|that  has to be so small that the surplus
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of the workers s
c
is larger than the outside option s; it can be shown that this
implies that the prot in the reference scenario is larger than in the cooperative
scenario. Therefore we can exclude 
c
> 
r
.
4 Conclusions
In this model it is shown that investment in human capital may lead to market
power for the insiders and is therefore comparable with insider harassment and
cooperation activities (Lindbeck and Snower (1988)), turnover rate used by rms
as incentive device (Lindbeck and Snower (1989)) and transaction costs (hiring,
training and ring costs, see Lindbeck and Snower (1986)). Therefore the sinking
of investments for productivity enhancing human capital may be an additional
reason for insider rent appropriation and involuntary unemployment.
Potential entry decreases the market power of the workers, however, and leads
to a higher share of the rm of rents generated by investment in human capital.
This is in line with the notion of Shepherd (1984), Stiglitz (1987) and Baumol et al
(1988) that sinking costs may create market power of the insiders and barriers to
entry. This result is, however, only achieved if the outside option of the insiders
is not too high and if there is a large number of outsiders.
In the benchmark scenario the ecient investment is derived. A social planner
maximizes the rent generated by the investment in human capital under the
constraint that the entire labour force is employed. The constraint implies a
maximal level of the outside option that can be set by the social planner. In this
scenario, the entire rent in addition to the outside option is attributed to the rm
in order to see the consequences of market power of the workers.
In the monopolistic workers scenario, it is in the interest of the workers to
share rents created by the investment in human capital in order to be sure to be
employed also in the next period. The surplus enjoyed by the workers and the
prot of the rm both increase with the eciency of the investment and decrease
with its costs. Investment may be higher or lower than ecient. On the one hand,
the workers have to share rents, therefore the investments in human capital are
biased downwards. On the other hand, there are fewer rivals than in the ecient
labour market benchmark (when the outsiders maximize the prot of the rm
and the insiders have no market power). Therefore the motivation to invest is
higher. The size of both countervailing eects therefore decides the eciency of
the investment of the monopolistic insiders. We assumed that the surplus of the
monopolistic workers is always larger than the highest possible outside option,
which requires a large enough number of outsiders.
In the insider-outsider scenario, the insiders choose for an investment-bonus
combination such that they will keep their jobs for sure and are able to match the
oer of their rivals.
17
The outsiders oer the highest possible prot to the rm in
17
This result is also achieved in comparable insider-outsider settings, compare e.g. Gottfries
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order to maximize their chances to enter the labour market, presuming that their
human capital will depreciate in the future. In this set-up, the entire labour force
will be employed if all workers imitate the ecient bonus-human capital decision
of the outsiders. This is the decisive factor that reduces the bargaining power of
the insiders. If it is not sustainable to keep the outsiders o, the insiders have
the option to let them in by imitating them and grant all the rent to the rm. In
this case, investment in human capital is ecient, while the entire labour force
is employed.
The insiders are only able to appropriate a part of the rent created by the
investment into human capital under very special circumstances, although they
have a rst mover advantage in committing themselves. The reason for this
nding is that sinking costs is also possible for the outsiders (insiders face in
this respect no better opportunities) and that the investment in human capital
increases rather than decreases rents from the employment of outsiders (as in
Lindbeck and Snower). Assuming that the number of outsiders is so large and the
outside option is so low that the prot oered by the monopolistic insiders is lower
than that oered by the outsider, we nd that the presence of outsiders decreases
the market power of the insiders. However, there are parameter constellations
to be found with a sustainable equilibrium without entry and a surplus of the
insiders higher than the outside option where the insiders oer the same prot as
the outsiders and labour demand is equal to the number of insiders. This means
that the insiders are able even under these circumstances to keep a part of the
market power by sinking costs for human capital investment. This market power
may be used to erect barriers to entry and enjoy still a higher surplus than the
outside option.
However, this is not automatically the case and the surplus of the insiders
may be smaller than the outside option. The insiders have to compare the surplus
earned with barriers to entry with the surplus enjoyed with letting the outsiders
in, i.e. the cooperation scenario. We assume here that the outsiders do not
automatically oer the maximal prot which gives them only their outside option
(as Lindbeck and Snower assume or as it is assumed in perfect contestability
models), but cooperate, if the insiders oer them this opportunity, because that
grants them always part of the rent a surplus higher than the outside option. In
this case the insiders invest in human capital such that all workers are employed
and signal therefore that they are willing to let all outsiders in. The outsiders
imitate the investment and bonus demand of the insiders that maximizes the rent
for all workers. In the cooperative scenario, the employment is the entire labour
force and investment in human capital is lower than in all other scenarios. All
workers are able to acquire part of the rent that decreases with the number of
competitors, while the rm enjoys a prot that is smaller than in the insider-
outsider scenario and the reference scenario.
and Horn (1987) or Carruth and Oswald (1987).
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5 Appendix
5.1 Dierent demand elasticities and the revenue function
In this appendix it is shown that dierent demand elasticities or market power
of the rm may be incorporated in the revenue function of the rm in equation
(1). If we assume that demand d is dened as:
d = Bp
 
with 1 <  < 1: The elasticity of rm's demand is lower when the consumers
are less elastic for the product and when there is less competition on the market
for the product. In order to obtain increasing revenues from production, it is
necessary to assume an elastic demand function ( > 1).
Then revenue R = py can be rewritten as:
R = B
1

y
1 
1

:= Cy

with 0 <  < 1:
This can be rewritten if we use the denition of y = El

c

from equation (1):
R = CE

l

c

:= Al

c

5.2 Proof that (4) is always smaller than (3)
If we maximize (4) with respect to b and c under the constraint that the rm is
on its demand for labour function (2), we obtain:
c
0
=
 

1+
A
s

!
1
2 2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2(1 + r)l
 1
!
1 
2 2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b
0
=
s
c
0

 
w
c
0
Then (4) can be rewritten to:
s
0
=
ls

(1  )  (1 + r)c
02
l
 1
Notice that
@s
@s
> 0: The maximal s into s
0
that is consistent with l < l
 1
; is
obtained by substituting b
0
and c
0
into (2):
s
0
<

2
A
l
1 
 1
0
@

4 
A
2


2

(1 + r)

l
2(1 )
 1
1
A
1
2 
15
Notice that s
0
is only smaller than
b
s (compare (8)), if
l
 1
L
> 
1
1 
which would
imply c
mon
< c
r
: The entire scenario is however not viable, if 1   < : This can
be seen from the condition on
l
 1
L
implied by s
mon
> s (compare footnote 13). If
1    < ; footnote 13 is not fullled for 
1
1 
: If we have 1    > ; however,
we have to show that s
mon
> s
0
:
If we substitute the maximal consistent outside option s
0
into s
0
, we obtain:
s
0
=
 
A
2

2


l
2 
 1
2

(1 + r)

!
1
2 

1    

2

l
 1
It is clear that s
0
is smaller than s
mon
(compare (13)), because we have assumed
2 <  in order to obtain a rising prot with a growing number of rivals (see
section 3.1).
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